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In the Suprenie Court of the
State of Utah
FEARN GRAY and LEILA GRAY,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

CASE
NO. 8524

EDWARD R. STEVENS,
Defendant and Appellant

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENTS OF FACTS
The respondents do not agree with the appellants'
Statement of Facts.
At the time this action was commenced, plaintiffs lived
in Payson, Utah. The home in which they lived was the
only real property in which they owned any interest (Tr. 1213). On the 19th day of January, 1955, plaintiff, Fearn
Gray~ declared a homestead in his undivided one-half interest in the property (Tr. 12). The homestead was declared
shortly before the defendant in this action levied an execution on Fearn Gray's undivided one-half interest in the
home to satisfy a judgment which Stevens had obtained
against Fearn Gray in an earlier action, Civil .No. 14,340.
On the 29th day of April, 1955, the plaintiffs filed an
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action to quiet title to the plaintiff Fearn Gray's interest
in the property in issue, which is located in Payson, Utah.
Fearn Gray's interest was that of a joint tenant (Exhibit
Plaintiff 2). The defendant, Edward R. Stevens, answered
and defended against the action to quiet title.
The plaintiffs' property was subject to certain encumbrances. There was a mortgage to the Cbmmercial Travelers Insurance Company in the amount of $5,830.96, the
existence and validity of which is not disputed (R. 7) (Tr.
46). The property is subject to a mortgage in the amount
of $1,588.00 (Tr. 11) to Ri·chard and Deon Gray, the existence and validity of which note and mortgage is in dispute
(R. 7).

The defendant resists plaintiff's action to quiet title
on the grounds that the mortgage to Richard and Deon Gray
is not a valid mortgage, and also on the grounds that the
down payment made on the Payson property in the year
1941 was made with funds which were misappropriated by
Fearn Gray. The background of that claim is as follows:
The defendant, Edward R. Stevens, had previously obtained a judgment against the plaintiff Fearn Gray in the
amount of $9,229.91 (Defendant's Exhibit 1) (See judgment,
Stevens vs. Gray, Civil No. 14,240), and the plaintiffs sought
to have the property freed from the judgment lien of Stevens. On or about March 4, 1939, a partnership between
Fearn Gray and Edward R. Stevens was dissolved (Tr. 19).
At tbe time of the dissolution of the partnership, plaintiff
Gray was indebted to the Bank of Spanish Fork in the
amount of $2,000.00, the Pacific Coast Farm Land Bank,
$1,500.00, and Utah Poultry Company in the amount of
$1,000.00 (Tr. 24). Two years and eight months later
Fearn Gray paid from a joint checking account which he
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maintained with his wife, the sum of $762.00 as a down payment on the purchase price of the home now in question (Tr.
4). He received title to the property in September of 1949
(Tr. 5). Eight years and three months after the dissolution
of the partnership of Stevens and Gray, Stevens filed on action against Gray, Stevens v. Gray, 259 Pac. 2d 889, for an
accounting of the partnership. Fourteen years and four
months after the dissolution of the partnership, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and
entered judgment for Stevens and· against Gray. Stevens
v. Gray, supra. In the findings in the case of Stevens v.
Gray, nearly fifteen years after the dissolution of the partnership, the court found that the defendant Gray had appropriated 31 head of partnership -cattle for his own use
and benefit at a time which was uncertain. Since the last
partnership cattle were sold on or about March 4, 1939,
Gray was charged with that amount as of that date (Tr.
18).
In January of 1950, Richard Gray and Deon Gray, his
wife, loaned to the plaintiffs the sum of $1,100.00 for the
purpose of opening a drive-in in Payson (Tr. 35). No payment was made on the mortgage to Richard and [)eon
Gray (Tr. 37). When the plaintiffs in this action learned
that the trial court's action in the case of Stevens v. Gray
had been reversed and that a judgment would be entered
against Fearn Gray, the plaintiffs executed a ,mortgage to
secure the $1,100.00 note for the purpose of prefering their
son and daughter-in-law over the creditor Stevens (Tr. 17).
On January 15, 1955, Fearn Gray filed a declaration of
homestead in the amount of $2,750.00, $2,000.00 representing the interest of Fearn Gray as the head of a household
and $750.00 for his spouse.
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It is undisputed that Fearn Gray was not possessed of
any property at the time he made the declaration of homestead, other than the property here in question (Tr. 12-13)
and the other elements of a homestead are not in dispute.
Appellant indulges in an erroneous statement throughout
his brief, that is, that the court found that at the date of
the dissolution of the Stevens-Gray partnership that Fearn
Gray received money. That was not the finding of the
court. The court found that at some time between 1936
and March 4, 1939, Gray had appropriated 31 head of cattle
(Tr. 18). Gray maintained at the trial of Stevens v. Gray,
supra, that he did not appropriate the cattle and the trial
court in _that case found with him. This is not to dispute
the fact that we are bound by the decision of the Supreme
C'ourt in that case. Gray testified that the $762.00 which
he used as a down payment on the house in 1941 came from
the sale of some cattle which he had purchased in the fall
of 1940 (Tr. 19).
STATE~IENT

OF POINTS

POINT I
THE FINDING OF THE COURT THAT A JOINT
TENANT'S INTEREST IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
A HO·MESTEAD INTEREST IS CORRECT.
POINT II
APPELLANTS' CONTENTION THAT LEILA GRAY
WAS A PARTNER IN THE STEVENS-GRAY PARTNERSHIP IS RAISED F1QR THE FIRST TIME ON THIS APPEAL, AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED BY THE
COURT.
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POINT III
. THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT
THERE IS A VALID MORTGAGE TO RICHARD AND
fDEON GRAY IS C·ORRECT A·ND IS, IN FACT, NOT DISPUTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
POINT IV
THE JUDGMENT O·F THE COURT QUIETING
TITLE IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF FEARN GRAY AND
LEILA GRAY ':DO THE HOMESTEAD INTEREST IN
PLAINTIFF FEARN GRAY'S UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF
INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY SUBJECT TO THE
MORTGAGES, IS CORRECT.
POINT V
THE FINDING OF THE COURT THAT THE PLAINTIFF FEARN GRAY HAS A HOMESTEAD EXEMPTIO·N
IN HIS UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF INTEREST OF THE
PROPERTY

HERE

INVOLVED

AND

THAT

THE

AMOUNT OF SUCH EXEMPTION IS $2,750.00 IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND IS CORRECT.
POINT VI
THE . O·BJECTION RAISED IN APPEL.LANTS'
POINT IV IS WITHOUT MERIT BECAUSE THERE WAS
NEVER AN ISSUE IN THIS CASE AS TO AN ALLEGED
MISAPPROPRIATIO·N OF ANY C'A'ITLE.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE FINDING OF THE COURT THAT A JOINT
TENANT'S INTEREST IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
A HOMESTEAD INTEREST IS CORRECI'.

A homestead may be selected from any property of
a husband or wife, or both, and by either, regardless of the
estate or interest therein, the only Imitation being one of
value. Panagopolus v. Manning, 69 P2d 614, page 620.
Appellant argues in Point V of his brief that to permit
a judgment debtor to declare a ·homestead in his separate
property has the effect of doubling the amount of the exemption provided for by statute. The difficulty with the
appellant's argument is that the· statute specifically declares that either spouse may declare the homestead in the
property of both or in the property if either of them. In
the case of Williams v. Peterson, 86 Utah 526, 46 P 2d 674,
the wife declared the homestead in the property of her husband, because her husband was the judgment debtor. The
amount of the exemption was $2,750.00. The wife claimed
the exemption in the husband's estate at a time when she
was a joint owner of that very same estate.
The fact that the wife can claim a homestead in a husband's estate does not have the effect of doubling the exemption of the household, because only one homestead may
be declared. If both the husband and wife were judgment
debtors, the effect of the homestead would not be to exempt
property in the amount of $5,500.0, but it would exempt
property in the amount of $2.750.00.
This is the plain intent of the statutes and the Utah
cases have so construed our statutes.
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If, in the Williams v. Peterson case, supra, the wife
could declare the homestead in the joint interest of a husband, then most certainly in this case the husband may declare a homestead in his own joint interest. Connsel argues that if this position is correct that joint tenants gain
greater rights under the homestead law than would spouses
who own property either as co-tenants or if the property
were held solely in the name of one of the spouses. The
complete ans\ver to appellant's Point V is the fact that the
only homestead exemption allowed to a husband and wife
is an exemption in the amount of $2,750.00. This exemption is intended to protect the household. It is not designed
to protect against judgments against one spouse more than
the other. If a judgment against either spouse or against
both threatens the household, the exemption granted by
the homestead may be invoked.
Appellant engages in the fiction that a homestead exemption declared by a judgment debtor out of his joint interest has the effect of creating an exemption in the amount
of $5,500.00, rather than $2,750.00. The fact is that if there
were a judgment against both spouses the total exemption
would be $2.750.00, and it would make no difference in what
property the exemption was declared.
In this case the judgment was against the husband only.
Only the husband declared the homestead and the declaration exempted his interest to the extent of $2,750.00.
The greate weight of authority holds that there may
be a homestead right in property held jointly or in common.
40 Corpus Juris Secundum, Page 525, Thompson on Homestead and Exemption, page 156, 89 A.L.R., page 540. Marvin and Company v. Piazza, 276 P 680, COle et al v. Coons,
167 P2d 295.
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PO,INT II
APPELLANTS' CONTENTION THAT LEILA GRAY
WAS A PARTNER IN THE STEVENS-GRAY PARTNERSHIP IS RAISED ~OR THE FIRST TIME ON THIS APPEAL, AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED BY THE
COURT.

The contention that Leila Gray was a partner in the
partnership of Gray and Stevens is raised for the first time
on this appeal. No such claim was made in the district
court.
Finding Number 2 in Civil Number 14,340, defendants
Exhibit 1, supra, found that Stevens and Gray were the
partners.
Counsel, a page 13 of his brief, sets forth the following statement of law:
"A judgment rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter is conclusive and
undisputable evidence as to all rights, questions, or
facts put in issue in the suit and actually adjudicated
thereon where the same comes again into controversy
between the same parties or their privies, even though
according to the decision on the questions, the subsequent proceedings are on a different cause of action,
since the law abhors a multiplicity of suits." 50 CJS,
page 168, sec. 711.
In view of the finding in the Stevens vs. Gray lawsuit
that there was a partnership and that Mr. Stevens and Mr.
Gray were the partners, the court should not seriously regard appellant's argument that Mrs. Gray was also a partner. The partners were detennined in the earlier case.
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That decree based upon Finding Number 2 in Civil 14,340
is conclusive on the court in this case.
POiNT III
THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT
THJERE IS A VALID MORTGAGE TO RICHARD AND
DEON GRAY IS CORRECT AND IS, IN FACT, NOT DISPUTED BY THE EVIDEN,CE.
The claim of the defendant that this mortgage is not
a valid mortgage is totally without merit. The plaintiffs
admit that the mortgage given to Richard and Deon Gray
was given to prefer Richard and Dean Gray over Edward
R. Stevens. This plaintiffs had a right to do. UCA 1953,
6-1-20. · Such a preference may be given in the exerci~ of
a lawful right, and will not affect the conveyance. Nor is
it necessarily indicative of fraud that the preferred creditors are relatives of the assignors. (Pettit v. Parsons, 9 Utah
223, 33 Pac. 1038). Fraud will not be presumed. It must
be alleged, and the party alleging it must prove it by competent evidence. Pettit v. Parsons, supra.
Fraud must be specially pleaded. Utah URPC, Rule
9(b). An examination of plaintiffs' answer and of their
additional answer wiH disclose that the answer alleges that
the mortgage was executed for the purpose of defeating the
defendant's judgment in the Stevens v. Gray case. The
answer of the defendant, however, merely alleges that ther
is nothing due or owing on the mortgage. There is no reference to the mortgage to Richard and Deon Gray in the
additional answer.
The mortgage of Richard and Deon Gray in the sum
of $1588.00 (Tr. 11) secured a note which was given in Feb-
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ruary 1, 1950. The consideration given for said note was the
sum of $1,100.00. Five Hundred dollars ($500.00) was
drawn out of the Zion's Savings and Trust, Three Hundred
dollars ($300.00) from the Commercial Bank of Utah, and
the sum of Three Hundred dollars ($300.00) from cash that
Richard and Deon Gray had in their home (R. 35). This
money was used by the plaintiffs to open a drive-in at Payson, Utah. ·The note which was introduced into evidence
(P. Exhibit No. 3) was identified by Mr. Gray (Tr. 10) as
the note given in exchange for the money borrowed. Richard Gray testified that he received the note in exchange for
the said $1,100.00 (Tr. 35).
The defendant in no way refuted plaintiffs' claim that
there was money due and owing to the son and daughter-inlaw of the plaintiff. Defendant's only evidence in that regard is the bald statement that additional evidence should
have been presented to substantiate the note. Under the
Uniform Negotiable Instrument Act adopted by the State
of Utah, and which is now the law of the State, consideration is presumed. U.C.A., 1953 Title 44-1-25, reads as follows: "Presumption of consideration. Every negotiable
instrument is deemed prima facie to have been issued for
a valuable consideration, and every person whose signature appears thereon, to have become a party thereto for
value.''
Under the above law there is a presumption that the
note and mortgage given to Reichard and Deon Gray when
introduced into evidence and properly identified are valid.
The burden then falls upon the defendant to prove some infirmity. Hudson vs. Moon, 130 Pacif.ic 774.
The defendant did not introduce any evidence of his
own or by cross examination to prove that the said note and
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mortgage \Vere not a valid and existing debt. ·There is not
one scintilla of evidence to show that this was a so-called
device to eliminate the judgment of the defendant. Plaintiffs admit that the mortgage given to his son was to prefer him and was made in good faith ·and to secure the advancement made three years before. This in itself does
not make the transaction fraudulent, 6-1-20 Utah Code Annotated, 4 Am. Juris. 397. The plaintiff, Fearn Gray, had
been in a bitter lawsuit with the defendant, and realizing
that a judgment was about to be placed of record, he gave
his son and daughter-in-law a mortgage to secure their
loan. The plaintiffs had no other property.
In the absence of any pleading alleging fraud and in
the absence of any evidence which would support a contention of fraud, the trial court was emminently justified in
finding that the mortgage to Richard and Deon Gray was
. a valid mortgage and a lien on the property.
POINT IV
THE JUDGMENT O·F THE COURT QUIETING
TITLE IN FAVO~R OF PLAINTIFF FEARN GRAY AND
LEILA GRAY TO THE HOMESTEAD INTEREST IN
PLAINTIFF FEARN GRAY'S UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF
INTEREST IN THE PROPE.RTY SUBJECT TO THE
MORTGAGES, IS CORRECT.

Respondents claim that the homestead interest is invalid because it was obtained with misappropriated funds.
This claim relates to the down payment on the home in the
amount of $762.00 which was paid in 1941.
Respondents do not dispute the authorities listed on
page 14 of appellants' brief to the effect that a homestead
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which has been acquired with misappropriated money cannot be defended as against the person whose money has
been misappropriated and applied on the payment of the
claimed homestead.
This claim of the appellant's has been made in the appellant's "Additional Answer" which was filed at the date
of this trial.
In considering this question, it should be born in mind
that this claim was an affirmative defense. The burden
of proof on that issue was on the defendant. (Bancroft
Code Pleading, page 977).
Appellant repeatedly asserts that Gray was possessed
of some $3,400.00 at the time of the dissolution of the Stevens-Gray partnership. This is not correct. Gray was
charged with having 31 head of cattle for which he had
not accounted, and the court charged him with the value
of those cattle.
The record does not show that Fearn Gray had any
money at the dissolution of the partnership. The testimony
was that he did not have any money, and that he was heavily in debt.
In order to impress the homestead interest of Fearn
Gray with a trust, it is necessary to establish that the homestead was acquired with misappropriated funds.
"The right of the owner of misappropriated property to follow it and thereby acquire priority over other
creditors of the wrong-does is no longer available if
the property has been wholly dissipated." Scott on
Trusts, 1939, Vol. 3, page 2500.
"As has been stated, the mere fact that claimant's
property has been mingled with that of the wrong-doer
in one indistinguishable mass does not preclude him

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
from having a preference over the creditor's of the
wrong-doer. Thus, where the claimant's property is
deposited in a bank with money of the wrong-doer,. the
claimant is entitled to reach the deposit. Where, however, the whole of the deposit is withdrawn, the money
cannot be traced, the claimant is not entitled to priority over other creditors." Scott on Trusts, 1939, Vol.
3 page 2505.
Appellant, at page 15 of his brief, cites 3 Pomeroy
Equity Jurisprudence, 4th Edition, pages 3297,2401, and we
quote:
"A constructive trust arises whenever another's
property has been wrongfully appropriated and converted into a different form. Equity impresses a constructive trust upon the new form or species of property
(where property is wrongfully taken) not only while
it is in the hands of the original wrong-does, but as long
as it can be followed and identified in whosoever's
hands it may come, except into those of a bona fide
purchaser for value and without notice, and the court
will enforce the constructive trust for the benefit of the
beneficial owner or original cestui que trust who has
thus been defrauded."
This authority and the authorities which respondents
have been able to find are in agreement that misappropriated property may be impressed with a trus.t as long as it
can be followed and identified.
An examination of the opinion in Stevens v. Gray,
supra, will reveal that the amount of money with which
Fearn Gray was charged was arrived at by a mathematical
computation. There was no effort in that case to identify
any proceeds of the partnership assets.
There being no specific property or funds to follow, the
result is that Stevens becomes a general creditor, (Citation
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54 Am. Jur. P. 192. See also Ferchen v. Arndt, 37 P. 161,
State v. Foster, 38 P. 926), and as a general creditor a trust
would not be impressed upon the homestead interest of
Fearn Gray.
Plaintiffs would like to point out to the Court that the
claimed misappropriation applies to the $762.00 down payment out of a purchase price of $3,600.00, and only to the
down payment (Tr. 4).

POINT V
THE FINDING OF THE COURT THAT THE PLAINTIFF FEARN GRAY HAS A HOMESTEAD EXEMPTIO·N
IN HIS UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF INTEREST OF THE
PROPERTY HERE INVOLVED AND THAT THE
AMOUNT OF SUCH EXEMPTION IS $2,750.00 IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND IS CORRECf.
The trial court found that the reasonable value of the
home in Payson, Utah, belonging to Fearn and Leila Gray
to be $12,000.00. The following is a computation showing
th~ value of the interest of Fearn Gray:
VALUE OF HOME. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Less:
Commercial Travelers
Insurance Mortgage . . . . . . .
Richard and Deon
Gray's Mortgage . . . . . . . . . .
Total Mortgages . . . . . . . . . . . .

$12,000.00

$5,788.95
1,588.02
$7,376.97

7,376.97

V1alue of Home Less Mortgages ....
Less Leila Gray's One-Half Interest

$4,623.03
2,311.51

FE.ARN GRAY'S INTEREST .....

$2,311.51
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Under the Statutes of Utah, 28-1-1, UCA, 1853, the head
of the family is allowed an exemption of $2,000.00, and the
further sum of $750.00 for his spouse, making a total sum
exempt in the case at hand of $2,750.00 exemption. The
value of Fearn Gray's interest being the sum of $2.,311.51,
is less than that which he is allowed as the head of the family and his spouse under the homestead laws of Utah. Hence,
he has no interest in the property in question upon which
the defendant's lien could attach.
The trial court, in finding that the reasonable market
value of the property in question was $12,000.00, did not
err. Of the four real estate experts called to testify, three
put the value at $12,000.00 or less (Tr. 39) (Tr. 43) (Tr.
49) (Tr. 53).
Mrs. Gray's undivided one-half interest was not received as a gift from her husband; she paid a consideration
for it. Mrs. Gray's testimony that she had invested money
in her husband's business (Tr. 28) and that she had operated
a Drive-Inn at Payson, Utah, and had made payments upon
the Commercial Travelers Mortgage was undisputed. The
evidence shows that she contributed toward the purchase
of the home and toward the payments on the mortgage.
The equity of the plaintiffs after the deduction of the
two mortgages is $4,623.03. One-half of that is rightfully
the property of Mrs. Gray as a joint tenant, and is not subject to defendant's judgment lien.
POINT VI
THE OBJECTIO~N RAISED IN APPELLANTS'
POINT IV IS WITHOUT MERIT BECAUSE THERE WAS
NEVER AN ISSUE IN THIS CASE AS TO AN ALLEGE·D
MISAPPROPRIATIO·N OF ANY CATTLE.
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There were no Issues in this case respecting the partnership accounting which was the subject matter of the
Stevens-Gray suit. The cattle to which appellant refers
in p·oint IV were part of the subject. matter of the StevensGray lawsuit. They were the subject of a particular finding
by the court in the earlier case. Respondent is bound by
the decree in the earlier lawsuit as is the appellant. A findi~ng by the court on that issue would have been completely
useless.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVE McMULLIN,
DALLAS H. YOUNG, JR.
Attorneys for Respondent
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